The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies

JAMES N. DRUCKMAN[1] & PAUL V. WARWICK[2]
[1]*University of Minnesota, USA;* [2]*Simon Fraser University, Canada*

Abstract. Although much has been discovered concerning the resources and preferences that parties take into the coalition formation game in Western European parliamentary democracies, we know a good deal less about the payoffs they receive. Portfolios constitute an important payoff, not just because they provide access to patronage, but because influence over policy decisions tends to go with control over the key government portfolios. It is easy to discover which and how many portfolios each party holds in any government, but what is missing is accurate measurement of the value or salience of these portfolios. Some attempts have been made to measure portfolio salience, but they have lacked one or more of the following properties: cross-national scope, country-specific measurement, coverage of the full set of postwar portfolios, measurement by multiple experts and measurement at the interval level. In this article, we present a new data contribution: a set of portfolio salience scores that possesses all of these properties for 14 Western European countries derived from an expert survey. We demonstrate the comprehensiveness and reliability of the ratings, and undertake some preliminary analyses that show what the ratings reveal about parliamentary government in Western Europe.

How do coalition governments form in parliamentary systems? How do the parties that comprise them distribute portfolios and determine policies? How long do these governments last? Over the past half-century, a diverse range of theories has appeared and a number of remarkable data collection efforts have been undertaken to address these questions. Indeed, scholars have amassed an enormous amount of data on *nearly* all theoretically significant variables – including measures of government size, institutional variations, electoral expectations and, most notably, party ideologies.

We say 'nearly' all variables because there is one major exception: despite a few admirable attempts, we continue to lack comprehensive cross-national measures of the importance or salience of different cabinet portfolios. This article reports the results of our attempt to supply this missing piece to the data arsenal. The attempt is based on a survey of country experts from 14 Western European countries in which we asked each expert to rate the salience of nearly all cabinet posts present in his or her country during the postwar era. We present the results of the survey and establish the validity of

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the portfolio ratings in the expectation that the data will serve as a valuable resource in future studies of parliamentary government. We also illustrate the usefulness of this data set by using it to address certain basic but unanswered questions, such as how much is the prime ministership worth relative to other cabinet posts in these countries, and do the values of equivalent portfolios vary substantially across countries?

We begin in the next section by discussing the fundamental importance of measuring portfolio salience. We next discuss desirable attributes of a survey measure of portfolio salience and explain why previous efforts have fallen short. The remainder of the article is then devoted to describing our survey, presenting the ratings of portfolio salience in each country, and establishing that the ratings possess both the comprehensiveness and the degree of inter-expert agreement to serve as a solid basis for measuring the portfolio payoffs of government membership – a feature that is critical in the testing of coalition theories.

Why portfolio salience matters

In parliamentary systems, whenever elections fail to produce a majority party, it is generally the case that governments are formed through a process of inter-party negotiations and compromise. Theories of coalition formation usually try to explain how this process unfolds; in other words, how the assets and preferences that parties take into a formation process are translated into a specific outcome: a government with a certain party composition and a certain policy position (perhaps also a certain allocation of portfolios among parties). We already know a good deal about the input side of this process; for instance, we know precisely how many parliamentary seats each party controls and we know with a fair degree of accuracy each party's policy preferences (through many research efforts, including most notably those of the Comparative Manifesto Project). Yet what about the outcomes? Clearly, knowledge of how the rewards of government are divided up among the negotiating parties is just as important. As Laver and Schofield (1990: 164–165) observe: 'Payoffs represent the bottom line of the political process. . . . Of the things that the [coalition] theories set out to explain, it is only the distribution of payoffs among members that provides us with any information about the validity of the assumptions upon which the theories were built in the first place.'

Portfolios constitute the clearest manifestation of payoffs, not only because they constitute 'a particularly glittering array of prizes which ambitious politicians may crave' (Laver & Schofield 1990: 165), but also because a party's portfolio allocation usually determines how influential it will be over the policy

decisions of the government. A consequence of this is that coalition theories differ fundamentally over how portfolios will be allocated among the coalition partners. For example, some predict that coalition members will receive a share of portfolios proportional to their coalitional contribution of legislative seats (e.g., Gamson 1961; Morelli 1999), others focus on the relationship between portfolios and bargaining power (Mershon 2001; Schofield & Laver 1985), and yet others predict that formateur parties (i.e., those headed by the individual charged by a head of state with the task of forming the next government) will receive a disproportionate share of portfolios (Baron & Ferejohn 1989). This suggests that the investigation of how coalition governments actually allocate cabinet portfolios might prove to be crucial to the testing of these theories and the assumptions that underlie them. Surprisingly, however, most studies of coalition payoffs treat portfolios as fungible, assuming, for example, that the prime ministership is equal in worth to control of the sports ministry.

Many scholars recognize the implausibility of this assumption. As Browne and Franklin 1973: 458) put it: '[I]t will certainly make a difference to [a] party whether the ministries it receives are, say, the Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Finance, or if they are Sport and Tourism. In addition to a quantitative dimension operating in the bargaining context, then, we may reasonably expect that a qualitative one operates as well.' There have been some attempts to measure portfolio salience (e.g., Browne & Feste 1975; Budge & Keman 1990; Laver & Hunt 1992; Müller & Strøm 2000) and to apply these measures to the analysis of payoffs (e.g., Thies 2001; Warwick & Druckman 2001), yet, as we will discuss, these attempts do not provide reliable ratings of the full set of ministries in a broad cross-section of parliamentary systems. As a result, we continue to have little idea about the *value* of the payoffs parties receive.

The measurement of portfolio salience

Clearly, accurate measurement of portfolio salience would play a critical role in testing extant theories of coalition formation and payoffs, and in enhancing our understanding of coalition bargaining in general, but how should portfolio salience be measured? One approach would be to count the number of laws in each area, but this would capture neither policy nor patronage importance (and would not account for omnibus legislation). Financial figures also do not work since they might exaggerate the salience of expensive but less impactful areas (e.g., public works) and understate the salience of less costly portfolios (e.g., foreign affairs). A better alternative would be to solicit the assessments

of country experts. Reliance on subjective evaluations, even from well-informed observers, may not be as ideal as using more objective data, but, as Laver and Hunt (1992: 34) explain, these data 'do not manifest themselves in ways that can be calibrated using harder data sources. . . . Expert estimates of such parameters may not keep the most picky of purists happy but are very much better than no estimates at all.'

Following this logic, most prior attempts to gauge portfolio salience have relied on expert judgments in some manner. These efforts include country-specific rankings by experts (e.g., Groennings 1970: 75–79; Leiserson 1970: 85–93), matching specific party types with the obtainment of certain ministries (Browne & Feste 1975; Budge & Keman 1990: 89–131) and assertions about 'tiers' of ministries that ostensibly rank above other tiers, either across countries (e.g., Browne & Frendreis 1980; Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Laver & Schofield 1990: 181) or in a few specific countries (Thies 2001). Laver and Hunt's (1992) survey of country experts (hereafter referred to as LH) constitutes the most ambitious attempt, and the one from which we draw inspiration. They asked country experts to 'list the key cabinet positions that must be filled as part of the process of forming a government' (Laver & Hunt 1992: 125), ranking them in order of importance. Recently, the authors of the country chapters in Müller and Strøm (2000) (hereafter MS) built on LH's survey by filling out the rankings to cover more than the small sub-set ranked by LH's experts.

These measurement efforts serve as useful starting points; each, however, fails to satisfy at least one of five properties that we believe a valid measure should possess. The first two essential properties are *cross-national scope* and *country-specificity*: the measures should cover a wide range of countries where portfolios are typically or frequently shared among parties, so as to permit the comparative evaluation of coalition payoffs, but at the same time they should take into account the possibility of significant inter-country variance in the salience of similar portfolios. The fishery ministry in Iceland, for example, is likely to be substantially more salient than the corresponding portfolio in Ireland. Typically, one of these properties has been satisfied at the expense of the other. Thus, several prior measures either assume country invariance without evidence (e.g., Browne & Feste 1975; Budge & Keman 1990; Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Laver & Schofield 1990) or focus on only a country or two (e.g., Groennings 1970; Leiserson 1970; Thies 2001).

The third desirable property is that the measure should cover the *full range of ministries* in each country. Unfortunately, many efforts that meet this criterion fail on the previous ones – that is, they either apply to a single country (e.g. Groennings 1970) or assume invariance across countries (Bueno de

Mesquita 1979; Laver & Schofield 1990). Moreover, these latter approaches stipulate only that certain sub-groups of ministries (e.g., foreign affairs, interior) exceed the value of other sub-groups (health, education). Even if these judgments are correct, we have no way of assessing variations within these subgroups or differences across subgroups. As mentioned, LH present a rank ordering of a relatively small sub-set of 'key' portfolios without providing evidence that these posts exceed the unranked ministries (and if so, by how much).

The fourth property is that assessments should be based on the opinions of *multiple experts*. The point here is not just to mitigate the risk of idiosyncratic judgments, but to be able to assess the degree to which there is consensus in portfolio ratings. If one expert rates a portfolio, one cannot judge the likelihood that the rating is accurate; if ten experts rate the portfolio and they are in substantial agreement on that rating, we can be a good deal more confident in that rating. While LH's rankings of 'key' ministries are based on the responses of multiple experts per country, MS's extension of those rankings to cover all ministries is based solely on the impressions of the single-country authors that contributed to their volume; again, one criterion has been sacrificed for another.

The final property is the rarest: none of the studies mentioned thus far has it. This property is the evaluation of portfolios on an interval rather than an ordinal scale; in other words, the provision of *ratings* rather than rankings. The data sets that come closest to meeting the first four criteria are clearly the LH survey-based results and their extension to cover all ministries in MS, but both report only ordinal rankings of portfolios. With saliences expressed only in these terms, it is impossible to assess relative differences between posts and therefore impossible to tally the total portfolio payoff that each cabinet party receives. This means, in a nutshell, that the payoff predictions of the various coalition theories cannot be evaluated. Warwick and Druckman (2001) devised a means of converting LH's portfolio rankings into ratings, but they were obliged to treat all unranked ministries (the majority in most systems) as equal in salience. More important, they had no way of estimating how much more important the top post – the prime ministership – is than the next most important post and therefore no way of determining whether formateur parties (which almost always take that post) get more than their proportional share of office payoffs – a key expectation of several formal bargaining models (e.g., Baron & Ferejohn 1989). Similarly, without ratings, it is impossible to know whether there are tiers of ministries – subsets that are clearly separate from one another in terms of their value or importance – and, if so, whether these tiers vary across countries.

A portfolio salience survey

Because none of the previous measurement efforts provide data that meet the five criteria that we regard as essential, we decided to undertake a new expert survey of portfolio salience. The survey that we conducted from 2000 to 2002 covers the 14 Western European parliamentary countries that have been the focus of prior coalition research. The countries are listed in Table 1. To identify a set of experts who study parties, legislatures and/or policy in each country, we relied on the sample used by Huber and Inglehart (1995), the European Consortium for Political Research member's directory, bibliographic searches and referrals from other experts. We sent each potential respondent a cover letter, a questionnaire written in English and a return envelope. We contacted the initial list of experts (those from the Huber and Inglehart survey) in the fall of 2000 and again in the spring of 2001; as new names became available, we contacted those individuals and followed up with a reminder, where appropriate. By the summer of 2002, we had contacted 731 potential respondents and received 163 replies, a response rate of 22.3 per cent. With the exception of Luxembourg (which was not included in the Huber-Inglehart survey and for which it proved very difficult to find expert respondents via the other methods), we received responses from at least ten experts for each country (see Table 1). Thus, Luxembourg excepted, we substantially exceed the minimum of five experts per country that LH (Laver & Hunt 1992: 37) set as a standard.

The questionnaires were designed to ensure country-specific, comprehensive ratings of portfolios. What they could not take account of is changes over time or party-specific preferences – while these attributes would be desirable, they were beyond what could reasonably have been asked of our expert respondents. For each country, we used *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1945–2000), supplemented by data sections in the *European Journal of Political Research* and MS, to identify ministries that existed from the first normal election (or the resumption of democratic politics) after 1945 until 2000. We included all portfolios, excepting only those that existed very briefly many years ago (further details are available from the authors).

The decision to expand the survey's coverage beyond the current set of portfolios in each country was taken to provide enough data to undertake meaningful empirical analyses, but it did create complications. One major complication is that ministerial responsibilities sometimes get rearranged; for instance, one government might have a ministry of 'Sport and Culture' but in a later (or earlier) government in the same country 'Culture' may have been attached to 'the Arts' and 'Sport' linked with 'Leisure'. To make matters worse, in yet another government, 'Sport and Leisure' previously may have been

Table 1. The scale of the Portfolio Salience Survey

Country	Number of expert respondents	Number of posts rated
Austria	14	29
Belgium	12	31
Denmark	12	31
Finland	10	25
France (V)	10	28
Germany	13	26
Iceland	10	13
Ireland	15	23
Italy	13	32
Luxembourg	3	28
Netherlands	11	20
Norway	17	23
Portugal	11	24
Sweden	12	19
All countries	163	352

Note: Not all respondents rated all portfolios. The response rates per portfolio are given in the tables in Appendix 2.

listed in *Keesing's* as just 'Sport' – did responsibility for leisure activities disappear from the ministry or is its continued presence implied? The practice we followed is that whenever these 'posts', as we shall call them, were rearranged, we requested a rating for the post itself, rather than the entire ministry. Thus, if 'Sport and Arts' are always together (so far as we can tell), we requested a rating for the entire ministerial portfolio; if they occasionally exist apart from each other, we sought separate ratings for each component. The number of posts, so defined, for which we requested data in each country is given in Table 1. (We also allowed experts to add posts that we excluded; a few experts added such posts.)

In order to obtain interval-level ratings of these posts, we provided our respondents with an anchor by asking them to apply a score of 1 to all posts whose importance they believed equaled the 'average' or 'normal' portfolio. They were then instructed that any post that is above average should receive a score above 1 that would reflect just how much more important it is than an average portfolio (e.g., a score of 1.5 would indicate that the post is 50 per cent above average). Likewise, any below-average post would receive a proportional score of less than 1. An example questionnaire from Ireland is provided in Appendix 1. Notice that we neither emphasize policy nor

patronage, leaving the criteria for judging portfolio salience entirely to each expert's discretion.

The ratings

In the remainder of this article, we discuss the results of the survey and cast a preliminary look at what they can tell us about parliamentary politics in Western Europe. The results themselves, in the form of mean ratings (together with standard errors and respondent numbers) for each cabinet post in each of the 14 countries covered by the survey, are presented in Appendix 2. It should be noted that the ratings are 'net' ratings for each post. This means, for example, that the rating for the post of Deputy Prime Minister refers only to that post; if that position happens to be combined with control of another ministry, the total portfolio allocation to the deputy prime minister would be the sum of the two scores. Note also that the score for certain posts, such as second or subordinate ministers in Sweden, are scaling factors – they should be multiplied by the score for the (full) ministry in question to get the salience value for any subordinate minister. While we tried to be as comprehensive as possible in the survey, it is obvious that not every post that existed in the postwar era could be included – eventually the point is reached where the posts become too obscure or too remote in time to expect respondents to give meaningful evaluations. Thus, the first issue to be examined is: How comprehensive are the ratings?

Comprehensiveness

To assess the portfolio coverage of our survey results, we created a dataset consisting of all distributed portfolios in the 14 countries from the resumption to democratic politics after the Second World War to 2000, and calculated the percentage of portfolios for which we have portfolio weights. The results are presented by country in Table 2. In the first column, we report the percentage of ministries to which our weights directly apply – for example, we have a rating for the education portfolio in Ireland (1.19) and we can use that rating to judge the salience of the education portfolio that existed in the ten Irish governments for which we gathered data. Across all countries, fully 87.4 per cent of all portfolios held in these countries have been directly rated by our respondents.

Although this rate is quite impressive, given the limited extent to which we could impose on our respondents' time and presume on their knowledge, it is

Table 2. Comprehensiveness of Portfolio Salience Survey data

Country	Percentage of portfolio ratings that are:					
	Directly available from surveys	Inferred (due to splits, etc.)	Summed from available ratings	Summed from partial ratings	Not available	Number of portfolios
Austria	81.3	1.8	15.4	1.7	0.8	240
Belgium	92.7	2.2	1.5	–	2.7	742
Denmark	91.6	–	6.9	–	1.5	334
Finland	85.9	12.9	–	–	1.1	519
France (V)	79.3	5.7	–	–	15.1	405
Germany	91.5	0.7	6.2	–	1.6	433
Iceland	72.9	21.5	–	–	5.7	247
Ireland	83.8	–	8.8	4.4	3.1	160
Italy	94.9	3.4	1.6	0.1	–	996
Luxembourg	84.3	3.9	1.4	1.0	9.4	415
Netherlands	84.4	6.4	3.3	5.8	–	360
Norway	82.2	0.8	12.7	–	4.2	118
Portugal	80.2	–	5.4	3.6	10.8	111
Sweden	76.1	2.7	4.4	1.8	15.0	113
All countries	87.4	4.6	3.3	1.0	3.7	5,193

by no means the full extent of our coverage of portfolios. In fact, the coverage can be extended considerably by making some basic assumptions. In the second column of Table 2, we have included portfolios that are not directly in our survey, but for which we are able to use information from the survey or elsewhere to infer a salience value. For example, we obtained a rating for the civil service portfolio in France of 0.73. In the 1973 and 1995 French governments, this portfolio was split into separate civil service and administrative reform portfolios. In this case, one can apply half our rating (0.365) to each of these posts (for further details, contact the authors).

Another fairly common scenario where inferences are possible is reported in the third column. These consist of cases where posts, as we have defined them, were merged, and it is possible to produce a salience value by summing the ratings of the component posts. In Ireland, for example, we obtained separate ratings for justice (1.24) and communications (0.91); they typically existed as separate posts, but are merged in the 1989 government. In this case, the ratings for justice and communications can be summed to produce a salience score for the combined portfolio (2.15). Splitting weights in half and/or summing weights may not be perfectly accurate – for example, if two ministries are merged, it may not be the case that each separate component has maintained its importance. Nonetheless, one can use the data, in some way, to make inferences about these portfolios (e.g., one could downgrade the summed weights).

It is only when we get to the fourth and fifth columns of the table that we find posts that were absent from our survey. Note that these cases comprise only a small percentage (4.7 per cent) of all portfolios. Rather than excluding them from the calculation of portfolio benefits entirely, we believe that it would be better to assume an average salience value of 1 for these posts. The fourth column reports the fairly small number of cases (1 per cent) where posts are combined, but not all of them are rated. An example would be a 'Culture and Science' portfolio where we have a rating for 'Science', but nothing for 'Culture'. In this case, the overall rating could be set to 'Science +1'.

The fifth column lists the frequency of cases for which we can neither directly apply a weight nor make an inference from our weights. That only 3.7 per cent of portfolios fall into this category suggests that assuming a salience of 1 for these portfolios would probably not add a great deal of error to the calculation of portfolio payoffs. There is another justification, beyond their rarity, for applying a rating of 1 to unrated portfolios. Table 3 presents a variety of descriptive statistics concerning the survey results, including each country's average, minimum and maximum portfolio rating. It is striking that, across all countries, the average portfolio rating is very close to 1.00. Moreover, for the individual countries, the average scores fall within a fairly narrow band

Table 3. Reliability of the Portfolio Salience Survey

Country	Average portfolio score (SD)	Minimum score (SD)	Maximum score (SD)	Cronbach's alpha	Correlation with LH		
					Coeff.	Sign.	n
Austria	0.93 (0.37)	0.44 (0.22)	2.11 (0.92)	0.95	0.93	$p \leq 0.01$	19
Belgium	0.99 (0.28)	0.62 (0.27)	2.02 (0.51)	0.94	0.55	$p \leq 0.09$	7
Denmark	0.93 (0.45)	0.31 (0.32)	2.31 (0.70)	0.97	0.52	$p \leq 0.02$	12
Finland	1.10 (0.45)	0.63 (0.19)	2.53 (1.02)	0.95	0.80	$p \leq 0.01$	12
France (V)	1.07 (0.48)	0.50 (0.36)	2.75 (1.12)	0.95	0.45	$p \leq 0.15$	12
Germany	0.97 (0.34)	0.54 (0.20)	2.12 (0.71)	0.95	0.90	$p \leq 0.01$	11
Iceland	1.11 (0.43)	0.58 (0.19)	2.12 (0.50)	0.98	0.89	$p \leq 0.01$	7
Ireland	1.01 (0.45)	0.37 (0.16)	2.30 (0.86)	0.97	0.88	$p \leq 0.01$	13
Italy	0.99 (0.45)	0.47 (0.25)	2.49 (1.20)	0.95	0.74	$p \leq 0.01$	11
Luxembourg	1.06 (0.35)	0.50 (0.00)	2.17 (0.76)	0.78	0.67	$p \leq 0.05$	9
Netherlands	0.99 (0.39)	0.35 (0.19)	2.02 (0.37)	0.95	0.90	$p \leq 0.01$	9
Norway	1.00 (0.35)	0.61 (0.20)	2.00 (0.50)	0.97	0.88	$p \leq 0.01$	10
Portugal	0.98 (0.39)	0.41 (0.32)	2.20 (0.53)	0.94	0.53	$p \leq 0.18$	8
Sweden	1.06 (0.36)	0.65 (0.21)	2.19 (0.67)	0.96	0.91	$p \leq 0.01$	11
All countries	1.01 (0.40)	0.50 (0.11)	2.24 (0.22)	–	0.73	$p \leq 0.01$	140

Note: The mean respondent rating for each portfolio was calculated first, then the average, maximum and minimum ratings were determined for the various countries. The standard deviations for the average scores are calculated across portfolios; the standard deviations for the minimum and maximum scores are calculated across experts.

(0.93–1.11) surrounding this value. These results suggest that, as requested, the experts used 1.00 as an anchor and therefore that this can be taken as the value of an average cabinet post.

Reliability

We noted earlier that confidence in the accuracy of the ratings will increase, *ceteris paribus*, to the extent that the expert respondents for each country agree on the salience values of that country's portfolios. To test for inter-respondent agreement, we use Cronbach's alpha, a statistic that uses inter-item correlations to assess the capacity of a measurement instrument to evoke similar responses from respondents. Cronbach's alpha ranges from 0 to 1, reflecting the similarity of experts' ratings, and scores above 0.7 or 0.8 are normally considered high enough to establish reliability. The alpha scores for the countries, which are given in the fourth column of Table 3, generally exceed this standard by a large margin. Indeed, with just one exception, all scores are above 0.94, indicating an extraordinary degree of consensus among respondents in each country on the relative salience of cabinet portfolios in that country. The one exception is, of course, Luxembourg, where the shortage of respondents means that inter-item correlations can occasionally be modest for idiosyncratic reasons.

Another way to establish the viability of the ratings is to compare them with LH's rankings. To do this, we first turned our ratings into rankings (since LH provide only rankings). We then correlated, using Spearman's rank-order correlation (rho), our rankings with the LH rankings for the set of ministries covered in both surveys. In the right-most column of Table 3, we report these correlations, along with two-tailed p-values and the number of portfolios compared for each country. For eight of the 14 of countries, the rank-order correlations are impressively high (at or above 0.80). As for the others, it is often the case that the ranking of a single portfolio ranking causes the discrepancy. In Belgium, for instance, LH have justice as tied (with finance) for the highest rank, while our survey places it in fifth place among the seven portfolios scored by both surveys. If this portfolio is excluded, however, the rank-order correlation for Belgium rises from 0.67 to 0.93 ($p \leq 0.01$). Similarly, excluding the environment portfolio in France, which LH have as the second most salient, raises the correlation for that country from 0.45 to 0.78. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that these correlations are based on a small and unrepresentative subset of portfolios – those considered to be the most important in LH's survey (excluding the prime ministership). This restriction in variation might easily have caused the true degree of agreement between LH's respondents and ours to be underestimated.

Variation across portfolios and countries

The portfolio ratings that emerge from our expert survey thus appear to possess the important properties of comprehensiveness and reliability. The pursuit of comprehensiveness could easily have compromised reliability if the large number of portfolios had evoked highly disparate estimates of salience for many of them. Instead, the experts we surveyed are very much in agreement amongst themselves on the relative value of these portfolios and substantially in agreement with the experts surveyed more than a decade earlier by LH. This is a gratifying result, but it would not mean a great deal if it turned out that portfolio saliences do not vary much within countries or across them. In this subsection, we address the issue of how much portfolios vary in salience and whether that variation follows the patterns previously suggested in the literature.

An answer to the first question is contained in the second and third columns of Table 3, which report the minimum and maximum ratings in each of the countries surveyed. The spread is large, with the average minimum rating clustered around 0.50 (no country has a minimum larger than 0.65) and the average maximum clustering around 2.24 (none is lower than 2.00). Over all countries, the average top portfolio in the survey is worth nearly four and a half times the average bottom portfolio. This is based on the posts included in the surveys. It is possible that the true range is actually greater. This could happen if a low-ranked portfolio happened to be divided into two separate portfolios in some governments and half the ratings are attributed to each component. This highlights the importance of accounting for differences in portfolio salience, rather than assuming equal worth for all portfolios.

One particularly notable feature of these ratings' ranges is that a substantial part of the total range is accounted for by the exceptionally high salience attributed to the top-rated portfolio in all countries: the prime ministership. In fact, with the exception of Luxembourg (due to the small sample size), the value of the prime ministership significantly exceeds the value of the next rated portfolio in every country (using a *t*-test, the one-tailed *p*-value for each country equals or is below 0.02) (these and all other results not reported in full are available from the authors). Clearly, the prime ministership is more than just the top portfolio; it is the stellar post. This tends to be taken for granted in systems where single parties form governments and success in winning elections often rides with the popularity of the party leader, but these results suggest that it is true even in systems where coalition governments (and hence inter-party cooperation) prevail.

The extraordinary salience of the prime ministership is in evidence in all countries surveyed, but it by no means accounts for all of the variation in

portfolio ratings. In fact, excluding the prime ministership, we still find that the average top portfolio is valued at 3.6 times the average bottom portfolio. What other portfolios stand out? Laver and Schofield (1990: 181) suggest that the next most important portfolios, after the prime ministership, include foreign affairs, the interior and finance, and that defence or agriculture may be important 'depending on local circumstances'. This conclusion can be examined in general terms by grouping together common ministries across countries. (The scores are comparable since we asked the experts to use a standard scale). The results are presented in Figure 1, which plots the minimum, average and maximum ratings across countries for all ministries that existed in at least five countries.

The mean scores plotted in Figure 1 show that finance, foreign affairs and interior are indeed the most valuable portfolios after the prime ministership, generally speaking. The rising slope of the line of means on the right of the figure suggests that this set of ministries rates well above the rest. In addition, defence and agriculture, as anticipated, exhibit substantial variation ranging from highs of 1.38 (France V) and 1.24 (France V) to lows of 0.56 (Ireland) and 0.71 (Belgium), respectively. On average, these two ministries also appear less valuable than the others.



Figure 1. Cross-national portfolio values.

A more theoretical perspective on this differentiation among portfolios has been advanced by Bueno de Mesquita (1979; see also Browne & Frendreis 1980). He regards the six ministries discussed thus far – the prime ministership, defence, interior (or 'home'), foreign affairs, agriculture and finance – as distinguished by the fact that they alone have the capacity to affect the electoral prospects of the parties that hold them. He (Bueno de Mesquita 1979: 62–63) calls these portfolios 're-distributive', since their possession can induce electoral changes that cause parliamentary seats to be re-distributed among parties, and he argues that they are especially prized because of that property.

Following Bueno de Mesquita's reasoning, one might expect that these ministries – which we refer to as 'electorally salient' – would not only top the list of the most valuable portfolios, but would clearly distinguish themselves from the other portfolios, much as the prime ministership clearly stands above everything else. To see if this is the case, we present the mean ratings of electorally salient and non-electorally salient portfolios by country in the first two columns of Table 4. It is evident that the six electorally salient portfolios are more valuable, on average, in every country. The third column shows that these differences are statistically significant across the board. This comparison with all other portfolios may be a little misleading, however, since the comparison group includes a variety of very low-rated portfolios, as we have seen. A fairer test might be to compare the six electorally salient portfolios to the top six non-electorally salient portfolios in each country. The mean ratings for the latter, shown in the fourth column of the table, are consistently lower than the mean ratings for the electorally salient portfolios (column 1). The differences are not as sharp, however, and as the final column in the table reveals, they are *not* statistically significant at conventional levels in most of the countries.

Another complication is that the higher mean ratings for the electorally salient portfolios as a group may be largely due to the exceptionally high ratings for the prime ministership. We already know that the prime ministership is valued well above the rest; what matters at this point is whether the other top posts should be seen as forming a distinctive tier. If we exclude the prime ministership from the set of electorally salient portfolios, the significant difference between the set of electorally salient posts and the set of all other posts persists in 12 of the 14 countries. However, if the comparison is made only with the top six non-electorally salient portfolios, it becomes insignificant in all but two countries (France and Iceland).

The bottom line is that the six electorally salient portfolios identified by Bueno de Mesquita (and Laver and Schofield) are generally at or near the top of the ratings, but – with the exception of the prime ministership – it cannot

Table 4. Analyzing electorally salient ministries

Country	Mean electorally salient portfolio score (a)	Mean non-electorally salient portfolio score (b)	Difference of means test (a versus b)		Mean score of top 6 non-electorally salient portfolios (c)	Difference of means test (a versus c)	
			T-ratio	Sign.		T-ratio	Sign.
Austria	1.29	0.81	3.45	$p \leq 0.01$	1.10	0.89	$p \leq 0.20$
Belgium	1.22	0.92	2.45	$p \leq 0.01$	1.14	0.39	$p \leq 0.35$
Denmark	1.50	0.80	4.35	$p \leq 0.01$	1.20	1.36	$p \leq 0.10$
Finland	1.45	0.97	2.45	$p \leq 0.01$	1.04	1.35	$p \leq 0.10$
France (V)	1.73	0.88	5.41	$p \leq 0.01$	1.23	2.11	$p \leq 0.05$
Germany	1.39	0.84	4.53	$p \leq 0.01$	1.04	1.86	$p \leq 0.05$
Iceland	1.54	0.91	3.29	$p \leq 0.01$	1.02	2.43	$p \leq 0.05$
Ireland	1.47	0.86	3.10	$p \leq 0.01$	1.16	1.16	$p \leq 0.15$
Italy	1.55	0.85	4.25	$p \leq 0.01$	1.26	1.18	$p \leq 0.15$
Luxembourg	1.33	0.94	2.69	$p \leq 0.01$	1.14	0.86	$p \leq 0.25$
Netherlands	1.26	0.83	2.52	$p \leq 0.01$	1.05	1.05	$p \leq 0.20$
Norway	1.36	0.89	3.21	$p \leq 0.01$	1.12	1.19	$p \leq 0.15$
Portugal	1.39	0.83	3.73	$p \leq 0.01$	1.11	1.44	$p \leq 0.10$
Sweden	1.39	0.93	2.78	$p \leq 0.01$	1.08	1.34	$p \leq 0.15$
All countries	1.42	0.87	12.98	$p \leq 0.01$	1.12	5.12	$p \leq 0.01$

be said that they are clearly separated from the rest. In fact, if we make the comparison of the five electorally salient portfolios (leaving out the prime ministership) to the top non-electorally salient portfolio in each country, we find that they are not significantly higher in ratings in any of the countries. Much the same conclusion emerges when we compare the key portfolios identified in LH with the rest. In general, our ratings are consistent with the identification of these portfolios as key: the average ratings for LH's key posts significantly exceed the average ratings for other portfolios in 11 of the 13 countries (Finland and Luxembourg are the exceptions). However, this group of key portfolios is not isolated from the rest. In fact, in nine of the countries, the top-rated non-LH portfolio is not significantly lower than LH's average key portfolio (and in four countries, it is higher than LH's average key portfolio).

This lack of distinction for this group is also evident in Figure 1, which shows that, across all countries, only the prime ministership, finance and perhaps foreign affairs are clearly distinctive; (average) ratings for the rest of the posts decrease in a relatively smooth fashion. Indeed, a comparison of the minimum scores for foreign affairs, the interior and/or finance with the average scores for several other ministries suggests that even these portfolios may not rank particularly high in several countries.

Figure 1 is also instructive for what it reveals concerning the degree of similarity in portfolio ratings across countries. As mentioned earlier, several prior measurement attempts have ignored inter-country variation and instead assumed invariance across countries. It is clear from the figure, however, that ratings for most posts vary quite widely. In fact, of the 25 ministries included in Figure 1, the minimum and maximum scores are significantly different from one another (at the 0.05 level) in 21 cases. (We use *t*-tests to assess this; specific results are available from the authors.) The exceptions include transport (where $p \leq 0.10$), foreign trade (where $p \leq 0.20$), culture (where $p \leq 0.10$) and development (where $p \leq 0.20$). We also find that of the nine ministries that occur in four countries (and are not included in the graph), the minimum and maximum scores significantly differ in every case (at the 0.01 level). This highlights the importance of accounting for inter-country variance; failure do so could result in flawed inferences about coalition politics and governance.

Conclusion

The research reported in this article is premised on the notion that the salience of cabinet posts constitutes an important but neglected topic in parliamentary studies. It is not just that offices matter to politicians for the personal 'perks'

and patronage opportunities they afford. The distribution of portfolios also reflects the payoffs – including the policy payoffs – that parties receive in the coalition game. The strongest (and most controversial) interpretation of this idea is the assumption that individual ministers are 'policy dictators' in their jurisdictions that underpins Laver and Shepsle's (1996) portfolio allocation model of government formation and survival. However, it is not necessary to go to this extreme to accept that a coalition party's influence over government policy (even policy negotiated among coalition parties) will increase to the extent that it holds the major portfolios in that government. Even for parties that care little for office-holding in itself, the key to assessing their payoffs from coalition bargaining is to understand the importance of the portfolios they have been allocated.

The measurement of portfolio salience has been handicapped not just by the absence of objective measures, but also – and more significantly – by the complexity of the subject matter. For some portfolios, there is no particular problem; every country has a head of government, a foreign minister, a finance minister and so forth. Yet beyond these basic posts, complexity and change are the bywords: jurisdictions get split, re-shuffled, re-combined and renamed in ways that are often difficult to trace. Our motivation for undertaking this research has been the belief that this complexity should not prevent the realization of a thorough measurement of portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary systems.

The properties we identify as critical to an adequate measurement effort are that it: be cross-national in scope, provide country-specific estimates of salience, cover (to the fullest possible extent) the full range of portfolios in each country, base estimates of salience on the opinions of a sizeable number of experts in each country and provide interval-level ratings rather than ordinal-level rankings of portfolios. The saliences reported in Appendix 2 meet, we believe, all of these criteria: they solicit ratings from at least 10 country experts in each of 14 coalition-prone systems (Luxembourg excepted) on country-specific lists of portfolios that (with suitable extensions) comprise more than 95 per cent of all postwar portfolios in those countries. While they are based on the opinions of experts rather a more objective or direct measurement of salience, the high degree of inter-expert reliability suggests that they possess the property of accuracy as well.

In future work, we plan to utilize these data more fully to evaluate the predictions of various theories and hypotheses concerning coalition payoffs. What we have shown at this point is that portfolios range greatly in terms of salience; that the head of government is the pre-eminent post, well above even the second highest post in salience in all surveyed countries; that there are three

or four posts that typically rank immediately below the prime ministership in salience, including the finance, foreign affairs and interior portfolios; that these portfolios do not constitute a distinct set or class, isolated in value from the rest; and, finally, that there is considerable inter-country variation in the ratings of similar posts. Our hope is that this is only the beginning of what the information provided here will reveal concerning coalition governance in parliamentary systems.

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Appendix 1. An Example Survey

A Survey of Portfolios and Parties in West European Democracies
Ireland

Name: _____

(this is for identification purposes only and will not be included in the data set)

Do you wish to receive a copy if this data set? If so, please supply an e-mail address:

_____

Cabinet Posts

In this section, our objective is to develop estimates of the importance of the various posts represented in post-war Irish cabinets. Although the importance of any cabinet post may vary over time or across parties, we ask only for a single overall estimate for each post.

To facilitate the task of evaluation further, we ask that you apply a score of '1' to all posts whose importance approximately equals that of an 'average' or 'normal' portfolio. For cases where a post is clearly above or below average in importance, your score should reflect the proportion by which the post in

question deviates from the average. For instance, if you believe the Finance portfolio is about 50% more important than an average portfolio, it should be given a score of 1.50; similarly, if the Tourism portfolio carries only two-thirds the importance of an average portfolio, it would receive a score of 0.67; and so forth.

The list of posts to be evaluated was derived by reviewing the cabinet compositions of all post-war Irish governments, as presented in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* and (for recent governments) the *European Journal of Political Research* data sections. Only those posts that have appeared with some frequency in post-war Irish cabinets are listed below. We have left room, however, for you to suggest any other portfolios that, in your opinion, deviate significantly from an average level of importance.

A final point. Portfolios often combine more than one area of responsibility, e.g. 'Commerce and Industry'. Whenever areas of responsibility are never separated, we have listed the combination as a single post. It occasionally happens, however, that certain responsibilities that are now combined in a single portfolio have been allocated to different ministers or even combined with other responsibilities in some previous government. In these cases, we have listed each of these areas of responsibility as a separate post. If an item listed below in fact constitutes a partial portfolio, it should be given a correspondingly small importance score.

Importance of Post-war Cabinet Posts in Ireland			
Post	Score (1 = average)	Post	Score (1 = average)
Taoiseach (Prime Minister)		Social Welfare/Affairs	
Tànaiste (Deputy Prime Minister)		Forestry	
Agriculture		Tourism	
Gaeltacht (Irish--Speaking Affairs)		Transport	
Defence		Energy	
Education		Environment	
Commerce/Trade & Industry		Attorney--General	
Labour		Fisheries	
Finance		Local Government	
Health		Lands	
Foreign/External Affairs		*Other Posts:*	
Justice			
Communications/Post and Telegraph			

Appendix 2. Portfolio Ratings by Country

Austria			
Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Chancellor	2.11	0.24	14
Finance	1.64	0.14	14
Vice-Chancellor	1.41	0.17	14
Social Welfare/Affairs	1.25	0.09	14
Interior	1.25	0.09	14
Economic Affairs	1.20	0.10	12
Foreign Affairs	1.18	0.10	14
Trade	1.10	0.11	12
Employment	1.09	0.12	12
Justice	0.99	0.06	14
Education	0.98	0.06	14
Science & Research	0.89	0.05	13
Reconstruction	0.88	0.09	10
Agriculture	0.86	0.06	14
Family Affairs	0.86	0.08	14
State Enterprises/ Nationalized Industries	0.85	0.08	12
Transport	0.83	0.04	14
Health	0.79	0.08	13
Construction & Technology	0.76	0.08	10
Environment	0.75	0.05	13
Consumer Protection	0.72	0.08	11
Defence	0.71	0.06	14
Electricity/ Electrification	0.66	0.07	10
Women's Affairs	0.62	0.05	13
Sports	0.59	0.09	12
Arts	0.58	0.07	12
Youth	0.53	0.08	12
Secretary (Minister) of State – Chancellery	0.50	0.07	13
Secretary (Minister) of State – Other Departments	0.44	0.06	13

Belgium			
Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.02	0.15	12
Budget	1.40	0.12	12
Finance	1.35	0.08	12
Foreign Affairs	1.28	0.08	12
Deputy/Vice Prime Minister	1.22	0.12	12
Education (Flemish or French)	1.17	0.07	12
Social Affairs/Welfare/ Security	1.13	0.10	12
Interior	1.10	0.05	12
Labour & Employment	1.09	0.10	12
Justice	1.09	0.05	12
Education (National)	1.09	0.07	11
Economic Affairs	1.02	0.10	12
Colonies (1946--1958)	0.99	0.12	10
Public Works	0.99	0.07	12
Institutional Reform	0.98	0.10	12
Regional Ministries (Wallonia, Flanders or Brussels)	0.95	0.06	11
Transport	0.92	0.05	11
Administration/Civil or Public Service	0.92	0.07	12
Communications	0.90	0.05	12
Reconstruction (1946–1958)	0.88	0.09	9
Post & Telegraph/ Telecommunications	0.85	0.05	12
Defence	0.83	0.05	12
Cultural/Community Affairs (French or Flemish)	0.82	0.09	11
Health	0.81	0.04	12
Foreign Trade	0.80	0.09	12
Pensions	0.73	0.08	12
Agriculture	0.71	0.04	12
Middle Classes	0.65	0.08	11
Secretaries of State	0.64	0.05	11
Science Policy/Research	0.63	0.07	12
Development Aid/ Cooperation	0.62	0.08	12

Denmark			
Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.31	0.20	12
Finance	1.88	0.13	12
Foreign Affairs	1.60	0.10	12
Environment	1.33	0.08	12
National Economy/ Economic Affairs	1.27	0.11	12
Interior	1.23	0.08	12
Taxation/Fiscal Affairs	1.22	0.09	12

Justice	1.17	0.09	12
Industry/Business (& Shipping)	1.10	0.08	11
Social Affairs/Social Welfare	1.09	0.06	12
Labour	1.03	0.06	12
Agriculture	1.00	0.05	12
Defence	0.97	0.05	12
Education	0.94	0.04	12
Health	0.90	0.08	12
Transport	0.89	0.08	11
Commerce	0.87	0.06	10
Public Works	0.87	0.08	12
Energy	0.83	0.09	12
Housing	0.78	0.06	12
European Market Relations	0.77	0.17	10
Cultural Affairs	0.68	0.05	12
Foreign Economic Affairs	0.59	0.09	10
Research/Research & Technology	0.58	0.07	12
Development Aid/ Cooperation	0.56	0.06	12
Communications	0.53	0.10	11
Fisheries	0.53	0.06	12
Nordic Affairs/Nordic Cooperation	0.38	0.08	11
Church/Religious Affairs	0.37	0.05	12
Greenland	0.32	0.06	10
Minister Without Portfolio	0.31	0.11	8

Finland

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.53	0.32	10
Finance (single minister)	2.01	0.19	10
Finance I	1.78	0.16	10
Foreign Affairs	1.71	0.16	10
Deputy Prime Minister	1.31	0.09	7
Social Affairs (single minister)	1.23	0.12	10
Trade (Commerce) & Industry	1.12	0.08	10
Education (single minister)	1.10	0.10	10
Social Affairs & Health I	1.08	0.14	10
Education I	1.02	0.09	10
Finance II/Deputy Minister	1.00	0.13	10
Foreign Trade	0.99	0.13	10
Agriculture & Forestry	0.94	0.04	10
Interior (single minister)	0.91	0.05	10
Transportation & Communications	0.90	0.09	10
Justice	0.88	0.07	10
Communications & Public Works (to 1970)	0.87	0.12	8
Supply (to 1949)	0.84	0.17	5
Environment	0.84	0.04	10
Interior I	0.82	0.07	10
Social Affairs & Health II/ Deputy Minister	0.81	0.11	10
Labour	0.80	0.05	10
Education II/Deputy Minister	0.71	0.09	10
Interior II/Deputy Minister	0.67	0.06	10
Defence	0.63	0.06	10

France (V)

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.75	0.37	9
Economy & Finance	1.92	0.03	10
Interior	1.63	0.09	10
Justice	1.48	0.12	10
Foreign Affairs	1.45	0.13	10
Education	1.40	0.08	10
Defence	1.38	0.09	10
Budget	1.25	0.08	10
Agriculture	1.24	0.07	10
Employment	1.13	0.12	10
Minister of State	1.06	0.13	8
Industry	1.06	0.08	10
Public Health	0.99	0.07	10
Territorial Planning (Aménagement du Territoire)	0.95	0.09	10
Housing & Infrastructure (Equipement et Logement)	0.92	0.07	10
Foreign Trade	0.87	0.10	10
Culture	0.86	0.07	10
Transport	0.82	0.08	10
Research & Technology	0.81	0.07	9
Relations with Parliament	0.78	0.14	9
Civil Service/Reform of the State	0.73	0.08	10
Post & Telecommunications	0.73	0.06	10
Environment	0.71	0.11	10
Delegate Minister (Ministre délégué)	0.69	0.08	8
Small/Medium-sized Businesses, Commerce & Crafts	0.66	0.05	10

Overseas Departments & Territories	0.55	0.06	10
Youth & Sports	0.55	0.06	10
Veterans, War Victims	0.50	0.11	10

Germany

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Chancellor	2.12	0.20	13
Finance	1.58	0.11	13
Foreign Affairs	1.41	0.09	13
Interior (Home Affairs)	1.27	0.09	13
Labour (& Social Affairs)	1.21	0.09	13
Head of Chancellery	1.18	0.08	13
Defence	1.12	0.09	13
Justice	1.02	0.06	13
Vice-Chancellor	1.02	0.16	13
Economic Affairs	0.99	0.06	13
Research & Technology	0.93	0.09	13
Transport	0.90	0.05	13
All-German/Inter-German Relations	0.86	0.05	10
Relations with Bundesrat/ Lander	0.85	0.06	11
Secretary of State	0.84	0.10	13
Agriculture (& Food & Forestry)	0.83	0.07	13
Science & Education/ Science	0.82	0.06	13
Secretary of State	0.82	0.07	9
Environment (& Nature Conservation & Reactor Safety)	0.80	0.06	13
Health	0.80	0.05	13
Telecommunications	0.75	0.12	10
Refugees	0.70	0.11	9
Families & Youth	0.68	0.07	13
Housing (& Planning & Urban Development)	0.68	0.07	12
Post Office	0.56	0.06	11
Economic Cooperation/ Development	0.54	0.05	13

Iceland

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.11	0.16	10
Finance	1.58	0.08	10
Foreign Affairs	1.55	0.09	10
Fisheries	1.27	0.05	10
Education	1.17	0.06	10
Health & Social Security	1.02	0.02	10
Agriculture	0.91	0.06	10
Industry & Energy	0.90	0.05	9
Communications	0.89	0.08	10
Social Affairs/Welfare	0.86	0.06	10
Trade/Commerce	0.79	0.09	9
Justice & Church Affairs	0.72	0.08	10
Environment	0.58	0.06	10

Ireland

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Taoiseach (Prime Minister)	2.30	0.22	15
Finance	1.83	0.13	15
Foreign/External Affairs	1.46	0.13	15
Tànaiste (Deputy Prime Minister)	1.30	0.15	14
Health	1.25	0.09	15
Justice	1.24	0.10	15
Commerce/Trade & Industry	1.22	0.07	15
Agriculture	1.20	0.04	15
Education	1.19	0.07	15
Social Welfare/Affairs	1.09	0.05	15
Labour	0.95	0.06	15
Environment	0.93	0.08	15
Communications/Post & Telegraph	0.91	0.06	15
Attorney-General	0.90	0.08	14
Local Government	0.89	0.09	14
Transport	0.77	0.06	15
Energy	0.70	0.05	15
Tourism	0.66	0.05	15
Defense	0.56	0.05	14
Fisheries	0.53	0.04	14
Gaeltacht (Irish-Speaking Affairs)	0.51	0.06	15
Lands	0.50	0.07	13
Forestry	0.37	0.04	15

Italy

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.48	0.33	13
Interior	1.78	0.16	13
Foreign Affairs	1.69	0.22	13

Treasury	1.64	0.14	13
Finance	1.32	0.08	13
Justice	1.23	0.07	13
Public Works	1.20	0.11	12
Health	1.19	0.13	12
Defence	1.19	0.08	13
Posts & Telecommunications	1.18	0.15	12
Education	1.10	0.14	13
Labour & Social Security/ Welfare	1.06	0.12	12
Deputy/Vice Prime Minister	1.00	0.10	11
Budget (& Economic Planning)	0.98	0.12	13
State Participation in Industry	0.98	0.09	13
Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno)	0.96	0.07	13
Transport	0.87	0.07	13
Industry & Commerce/Trade	0.87	0.05	13
State Investments (full ministry)	0.85	0.10	10
Agriculture (& Forestry)	0.83	0.07	12
Foreign Trade	0.83	0.09	11
Environment	0.69	0.07	12
Universities & Scientific Research (full ministry)	0.69	0.05	12
Culture	0.65	0.07	12
Tourism	0.60	0.05	12
Merchant Marine/Navy	0.59	0.05	12
EU/EEC Relations	0.57	0.07	13
Public Administration/ Administrative Reform	0.56	0.08	13
Relations with Parliament	0.56	0.05	13
Regional Affairs	0.52	0.06	13
Other Minister Without Portfolios	0.48	0.06	8
Under-Secretaries/ Secretaries of State	0.46	0.07	12

Luxembourg

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.17	0.44	3
Vice Prime Minister	1.53	0.15	3
Foreign Affairs	1.50	0.12	3
Treasury	1.35	0.12	2
Interior	1.33	0.09	3
Education	1.30	0.15	3
Finance	1.27	0.15	3
Middle Classes	1.23	0.15	3
Labour (& Mines)	1.10	0.06	3
Public Works	1.10	0.10	3
Justice	1.07	0.07	3
Agriculture (& Viticulture)	1.07	0.07	3
Economic Affairs	1.07	0.03	3
Social Solidarity	1.07	0.23	3
Public Health	1.03	0.03	3
Civil Service	1.00	0.36	3
Social Security/Social Affairs	1.00	0.00	3
Budget	1.00	0.00	2
Family	1.00	0.29	3
Culture	0.97	0.27	3
Transport	0.89	0.11	3
Public Housing	0.87	0.19	3
Foreign Trade	0.73	0.15	3
Tourism	0.70	0.20	3
Energy/Power	0.67	0.17	3
Defence/Armed Forces	0.62	0.06	3
Sports	0.50	0.00	3
Environment	0.50	0.00	3

Netherlands

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister & General Affairs	2.02	0.11	11
Finance	1.55	0.09	11
Vice/Deputy Prime Minister	1.35	0.06	11
Home/Interior	1.25	0.07	11
Social Affairs	1.20	0.08	11
Economic Affairs	1.20	0.08	11
Foreign Affairs	1.16	0.08	11
Education & Science	1.03	0.07	11
Justice	1.01	0.05	11
Transport (& Waterways or Public Works)	0.92	0.08	11
Health	0.91	0.04	11
Social Welfare/Services	0.89	0.11	11
Housing (& Planning or Reconstruction)	0.88	0.10	11
Defence	0.82	0.05	11
Environment	0.78	0.09	10
Agriculture & Fisheries	0.74	0.07	11
Development Aid/ Cooperation	0.63	0.08	11
Culture	0.55	0.11	10
Under-Secretaries/ Secretaries of State	0.45	0.07	8

Plenipotentiary Ministers – Colonies	0.35	0.07	7

Norway

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.00	0.12	17
Finance	1.66	0.07	17
Foreign Affairs	1.39	0.04	17
Petroleum & Energy	1.27	0.05	17
Industry	1.11	0.08	17
Social Affairs	1.11	0.04	17
Municipal Affairs/Local Government	1.10	0.06	17
Communications (& Transportation)	1.07	0.04	17
Health	1.07	0.04	17
Education (& Research)	1.02	0.05	17
Justice	0.98	0.05	17
Trade/Commerce (& Shipping)	0.95	0.08	17
Labour	0.92	0.05	17
Defence	0.92	0.06	15
Environment	0.88	0.04	17
Agriculture	0.84	0.05	17
Fisheries	0.80	0.06	17
Family Affairs	0.68	0.03	17
Church/Religious Affairs	0.66	0.05	17
Cultural Affairs	0.62	0.03	17
Foreign Aid/Development Cooperation	0.62	0.05	17
Consumer Affairs	0.61	0.05	17
Government Administration	0.61	0.05	17

Portugal

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.20	0.17	10
Finance	1.58	0.07	11
Foreign Affairs	1.33	0.06	11
Domestic Administration/ Interior	1.27	0.07	11
Education	1.23	0.07	11
Health	1.23	0.08	11
Public Works/Social Equipment	1.16	0.10	11
National Defence	1.13	0.09	11
Justice	1.11	0.05	11
Deputy Prime Minister	1.09	0.16	9
Social Affairs/Security	1.01	0.08	11
Labour/Employment	0.90	0.07	11
Ministers of State	0.88	0.15	9
Agriculture & Fisheries	0.83	0.08	11
Planning	0.81	0.11	11
Industry (& Energy)	0.81	0.09	11
Transportation & Communications	0.80	0.10	11
Trade/Commerce (& Tourism)	0.76	0.11	11
Deputy Ministers	0.72	0.13	7
Territorial Administration	0.65	0.08	9
Culture	0.64	0.10	11
Science	0.52	0.08	11
Secretaries of State (in Cabinet)	0.51	0.10	9
Secretaries of State (outside Cabinet)	0.41	0.13	6

Sweden

Portfolio	Mean	S.E.	N.
Prime Minister	2.19	0.19	12
Finance	1.68	0.06	12
Foreign Affairs	1.27	0.08	12
Labour/Employment	1.26	0.06	12
Health & Social Affairs/ Welfare	1.22	0.06	12
Deputy Prime Minister	1.15	0.10	12
Education (& Science)	1.07	0.07	12
Industry	1.06	0.07	11
Defence	0.99	0.04	12
Justice	0.99	0.06	12
Environment	0.90	0.07	12
Communications & Transportation	0.87	0.07	12
Foreign Trade	0.87	0.04	12
Commerce	0.86	0.07	12
Agriculture (& Food & Fisheries)	0.83	0.04	12
Housing	0.78	0.06	12
Public Administration/Civil Service	0.78	0.08	11
Culture	0.75	0.05	12
Second or Subordinate Ministers	0.65	0.06	12

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Address for correspondence: James N. Druckman, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1414 Social Sciences Building, 267 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA.
Tel: 612 626 1672; Fax: 612 626 7599; E-mail: druckman@polisci.umn.edu.